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<election if t1w will be helrl valirl is not a question for determination on this appeal. Nor an~ we here coneerned with
the legality oE the eharitable bequest under a valid will.
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Carter,
eoncurred.

~r.,

Traynor, J·., and Schauer, J.,

Edmonds, .J., and Spenee, J., eoneurred m the judgment.

[S. F. No. 18442.

In Bank.

Dec. 18, 1951.]

'fHE OI'fY AND COUNTY O:b' SAN FRANCISCO et a.l.,
Petitioners, v. 'fHE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE CITY
AND COUN'l'Y OF SAN FRANCISCO, Respondent.
[S. 11'. No. 18443.

In Bank.

Dec. 18, 1951.]

METHOPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Petitioner, v. 'l'HE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE CITY
AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO et al., Respondents.
[1] Prohibition-When Writ Lies.-A writ of prohibition is an

appropriate remedy to arrest the proceedings in a court whPn
they are without or in excess of its jurisdiction and there is
not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1102, 1103.)
[2] Discovery-Inspection-Power of Reviewing Court.-Notwithstanding that the superior court has jurisdiction to grant or
deny an inspection of documents and data claimed to be in
records of official proceedings of a municipal civil service commission (Code Civ. Proc., § 1000), a reviewing court may act
in a proper case when it appears that otherwise a failure of
justice will occur in a matter of public importance by a wrongful or excessive exercise of jurisdiction.
[3] !d.-Inspection-Power of Reviewing Court.-To leave the
matter of an unauthorized order for inspection of confidential
matter for possible correction on appeal would be too late,
would render that remedy inadequate, and would result in a
failure of justice.
[1] See 21 Cal.Jur. 583, 584; 42 Am.Jur. 144, 156.
[2] See 9 Cal.Jur. 499; 17 Am.Jur. 8.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Prohibition, §§ 11, 16(1); [2-4) Discovery, § 7.
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[ 4] !d.-Inspection-Prohibition.-A writ of prohibition will issue
to restrain enforcement of an order of court for inspection
of documents and data claimed to be the records of official
proceedings conducted by a municipal civil service commission
and used improperly in fixing the compensation of classified
employees on a parity with those in private industry, where
the information sought was solicited from private employers
on the written promise that its source would be held in confi.dence, and could not otherwise be obtained, and where the
revelation of the source of the information would foment
disturbance in both public and private employment. (Code
Civ. Proc., §§ 1000, 1881(5), 1888, 1892; Pol. Code, § 1032.)

PROCEEDING in prohibition to restrain enforcement of
an order for inspection of documents. Writ granted.
Dion R. Holm, City Attorney, and Norman Sanford Wolff,
Deputy City Attorney, for Petitioners in S. F. No. 18442.
Frank J. Hennessy and Kay Kimmell, United States Attorneys, William S. Tyson, United States Solicitor, Bessie Margolin, Assistant United States Solicitor, Kenneth C. Robertson,
Regional Attorney, James F. Scott, Senior United States Attorney, Fred N. Howser and Edmund G. Brown, Attorneys
General, Hartwell H. Linney, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Wilmer Vv. Morse and James E. Sabine, Deputy Attorneys General, Sullivan, Roche, Johnson & Farraher, Long &
I.Jevitt, George Rugland, Knight, Boland & Riordan, F. Eldred
Boland, .John H. Riordan and John H. Riordan, Jr., as Amici
Curiae on behalf of Petitioners in S. F. No. 18442.
Knight, Boland & Riordan, F. Eldred Boland, John H.
Riordan and John H. Riordan, Jr. for Petitioner in S. F. No.
18443.
Milton Marks and Milton Marks, ,Jr., for Respondents.
SHENK, .J.-The petitioners seek a writ prohibiting the
Pnforcement of an order of the respondent superior court
for the inspection of documents and data claimed to be in
the records of official proceedings conducted by the Civil
Service Commission of the City and County of San Francisco.
An alternative writ was issued.
In September, 1949, several hundred employees of the city
and county, representing as well other employees similarly
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situated, filed in the superior court a petition for the writ
of mandate naming as respondents the city and county of
San Francisco, its board of supervisors, and its civil service
commission. The purpose of the petition was and is to compel
the respondents to fix, establish and pay to each of the
petitioners and to persons similarly situated for the fiscal
year commencing July 1, 1949, and ending June 30, 1950,
the rates of compensation for the respective classifications
referred to in the petition in accordance with the requirements
of section 151 of the charter of the city and county.
Prior to July 1, 1949, but effective as of that date, the
board of supervisors enacted salary standardization and
annual salary ordinances providing for schedules of compensation to be paid officers and employees whose compensations
were subject to the provisions of section 151 of the charter.
That section as amended in 1943 provides that schedules of
compensation for municipal employees shall be in accord
with the generally prevailing rates of wages for like service
and working conditions in private employment or in other
comparable governmental organizations in the state. The
schedules are required to be recommended by the civil service
commission solely on the basis of facts and data obtained in
a comprehensive investigation and survey. The commission
is required to ''set forth in the official records of its proceedings all of the data thus obtained" on the basis of which
it makes findings and an order whereby a rate of pay for
each classification is recommended to the board of supervisors. The section provides that the salaries and wages paid
to employees shall be those fixed in the schedule of compensations adopted by the board as provided by the charter
and in accord with the provisions of the ordinance enacted
in pursuance thereof.
It was alleged in the petition filed in the superior court
that the commission made such a survey; that the commission
transmitted its findings and recommendations to the board and
that the salary ordinance was adopted in accordance therewith. The rates of compensation thus adopted for the several
classifications were set forth at length. The rates of compensation for employees in the same classifications in private
employment and other comparable governmental organizations were also set forth. It was charged that the commission
and the board disregarded the generally prevailing rates of
wages and that the established schedules were not in accord
with the prevailing rates for the period 1949-1950 as required
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by the charter provisions and as alleged. The adopted rates
as to 49 classifications, listed on a comparative basis with
those alleged to be prevailing, were stated to be grossly less
than rates in private and other governmental employment.
The petitioners also sought declaratory relief and the recovery of the difference between the ordinance rates and the
alleged prevailing rates in outside employment.
The defendants answered, making certain denials and admissions. The plaintiffs thereupon moved pursuant to section
1000 of the Code of Civil Procedure for an inspection of all
the documents, papers and data including the complete survey in connection with the preparation of the adopted wage
schedules. A hearing was had on the motion at which the
respondents presented evidence of the confidential nature
of the specific data sought to be examined, and the effect of
disclosure on the public interest. In making the wage rate
survey the commission solicited information from private
employers on the written promise and agreement with each
that the source of all information supplied would be held
in confidence, that the wage scales and other data would not
be identified except by a code known only to the commission.
The defendants gave testimony to the effect that but for the
written agreements and pledges to hold in confidence the
source of and identity of the employers furnishing the information, it would be impossible to obtain the voluntary
cooperation of the private employers in making the survey.
The names of nearly 200 private employers are in the record,
as are also the lists of wage rates assumed to have been
submitted by them ; but unprocurable except by compliance
with the order for inspection is the data whereby to identify
the employer submitting a specific wage list. It was also
shown without conflict that disclosure would foment public
disturbance and unrest in industrial employment relations and
would interfere with the competitive activities of the employers
in private industry.
The trial court granted the motion for inspection and a
stay order was entered for the purpose of permitting the
filing of the present applications for the writ of prohibition.
The members of the board of supervisors and of the civil
service commission joined in filing one application (S. F.
No. 18442), and Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, one
of the employers affected, filed another application (S. F.
No. 18443) for the writ to restrain the enforcement of the
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order for im:p0etion. Numerous briefs are also' on file on
behalf of the f'ta.te personnel hoard, various employers, and
the Secretary of I1ahor, TJnited States Department of Labor,
as amici curiae in support of the application for the writ of
prohibition.
[1] A. preliminary question relates to the basis for the
issuance of the writ of prohibition. That writ is an appropriate
remedy to arrest the proceedings in a court when they are
''without or in excess of'' its jurisdiction and there is not a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1102, 1103.)
[2] Notwithstanding the fact that the respondent court
unquestionably has jurisdiction to grant or deny the motion
for inspection, this court may act in a proper case when it
appears that otherwise a failure of justice will occur in a
matter of public importance by a wrongful or excessive exercise of jurisdiction. The reviewing courts have frequently
acted to resolve the problem on jurisdictional grounds where
the public interest has indicated the necessity for prompt
settlement of the issue. (See Spreckels Sugar Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 186 Cal. 256, 260-261 [199 P. 8] ; Rodman v.
Superior Cmtrt, 13 Cal.2d 262, 269-270 [89 P.2d 109] ; Fortenbur·y v. S~tperior Court, 16 Cal.2d 405, 407-408 [106 P.2d
411] ; Rescue Anny v. M~tm"cipal Court, 28 Cal.2d 460, 466467 [171 P.2d 8].) Thus the writ of prohibition has been
held to lie to prevent the exercise of an unauthorized power
in a matter as to which the subordinate tribunal has jurisdiction, no less than where the entire cause is without its
jurisdiction; and has also been directed to prevent the enforcement of an order. (Evans v. Sttperior Court, 14 Cal.2d
563, 579-581 [96 P.2d 107] and cases cited; A.belleira v.
District Court of Appeal, 17 Cal.2d 280, 290-291 (109 P.2d
942, 132 A..L.R. 715] .) In Franchise Tax Board v. Superior
Court, 36 Cal.2d 538 [225 P.2d 905], the writ was issued to
prohibit the enforcement of an order for inspection of tax
returns; and in Kahn v. Superior Court, 12 Cal.A.pp.2d 459
[55 P.2d 1186], the writ issued to restrain inspection of
private documents as an unauthorized exercise of judicial
power in a matter otherwise cognizable by the respondent
court.
In Coldwell v. Board of Public Works, 187 Cal. 510, 522
[202 P. 879], claimed confidential matter had been opened
to public inspection and it was held that it had lost its confidential character; and to similar effect is People v. King,
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122 Cal.App. 50, 57 [10 P.2d 89]. [3] Thus to leave the
matter for possible norrection on an appeal would he too late,
would render that remedy inadequate and would result in
a failure of justice. (See, also, Gorbacheff v. Justice's Court,
31 Cal.2d 178, 180 [187 P.2d 407].)
[4] Tested by these and similar cases no good reason appears justifying the denial of the writ if otherwise the
petitioners are entitled to protection against violation of the
agreements of confidence. We shall not pause to consider
whether the application filed by Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company as one of the employers shows that it is entitled
to the issuance of the writ. The question might be pertinent
were that the only petitioner. But since the issuance of the
writ in the proceeding brought by the city and county of
San Francisco would inure to the benefit of that petitioner
as well as all other employers who furnished information
pursuant to the agreements of confidence, the matter does not
require further notice.
Section 1000 of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with the
power of the court to permit inspection of documents in the
possession of the adverse party or under his control which
contain evidence relating to the merits of the action.
Section 1032 of the Political Code provides that the public
records and other matters in the office of any officer are at
all times during office hours open to inspection of any citizen.
Section 1888 of the Code of Civil Procedure states that all
written acts or records of official bodies, tribunals and public
officers are public writings. Section 1892 of the same code
accords every citizen the right to inspect and take a copy
of any public writing of this state except as otherwise
expressly provided by statute; and section 1893 requires a
public officer to give a certified copy thereof on demand and
payment of the fee therefor.
Section 1881, subdivision 5, of the Code o:f Civil Procedure,
provides the exception to the foregoing by the requirement
that a public officer may not be examined as to communications made to him in official confidence when the public interest would suffer by the disclosure. The petitioners invoke
protection of the agreements of confidence pursuant to this
section.
The statutory policy of preserving official confidence inviolate has been reeognized in appropriate cases. In Runyo·n
38 C.2d-6
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v. Board of Prison Terms and Paroles, 26 Cal.App.2d 183
[79 P.2d 101], the writ of mandate was sought for the purpose
of inspecting communications made to that board as constituting public records. In denying the writ the court observed the confidential nature of the information bearing upon
applicants for parole, some of which necessarily could be
obtained only upon the understanding that the persons giving
the information would be protected and their communications
treated as confidential. The record in the present case without
conflict likewise shows that the information could not be
obtained from the private employers solicited except upon
the express condition and pledge that the identity of the
source of the material would be treated as confidential. To
like effect are Fmnchise Tax Board v. Superior Court, supra,
36 Cal.2d 538, where every requested item of information
was supplied with the exception of the identity of the individual taxpayers; Whelan v. Superior Court, 114 Cal. 548
[46 P. 468], and People v. King, supra, 122 Cal.App. 50,
56-57. (See, also, Opinions of the Attorney General of California, vol. 1, p. 144; vol. 5, p. 145; vol. 11, p. 41; vol. 13,
p. 180; State v. Freedy, 198 Wis. 388 [223 N.W. 861] ; Gilbertson v. State, 205 Wis. 168 [236 N.W. 539] ; Lee v. Beach
Pub. Co., 127 Fla. 600 [173 So. 440] .)
The foregoing and other cases demonstrate that the right
of inspection may be curtailed in relation to communications
or portions thereof where the public policy, enacted into our
statutory law, demands that disclosure be prohibited. It
has been well said by the United States Attorney General,
now Justice Robert Jackson, (40 Op. Attorney General No.8,
April 30, 1941) that the concern should be to require the
keeping of faith with confidential informants as an indispensable condition of future efficiency. The United States
Supreme Court in Norwegian Nitrogen Prod. Co. v. United
States, 288 U.S. 294 [53 S.Ct. 350, 77 L.Ed. 796], declared
that although the plaintiff would be adversely affected it was
not entitled to disclosure of information of business details,
publication of which would reveal the identity of the manufacturers and might prove useful to competitors, where the
information had been secured by public officials under pledges
of secrecy. In United States v. Kohler Co. (E.D.Pa., 1949),
9 F.R.D. 289, (13 Fed. Rules Serv. 33,333), voluntary statements to FBI investigators were withheld from inspection
since disclosure would seriously prejudice the future usefulness of the bureau and since the information was given
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in confidence under pledge not to disclose its source. In
Federal Life Ins. Co. v. Holod (D.C.Pa. 1939), 29 F.Supp.
852, the Secretary of War was protected from disclosing the
defendant's draft records.
The courts generally have concluded that the public interest in preserving confidential information outweighs in
importance the interest of a private litigant in the absence
of considerations involving life or liberty. In Gilbertson v.
State, supra, 236 N.W. at 541, it was said that in all such
situations a choice must be made between policies, each independently desirable; that not only are the courts faced
with the necessity of making the choice, but with the extremely
delicate question concerning the relation between the courts
and other branches of the government ; and that the right of
the state to preserve the secret may be superior to that of the
litigant to compel its disclosure even though he may thereby
be handicapped as an unavoidable consequence. It is also
here shown by affidavits imd otherwise that the recognition
of the right of inspection in such cases will have far-reaching
adverse effect in other branches of government, both state
and federal. In such other branches, as here, the desired information cannot be had at least from private employers
without the similar agreements of confidence. Therefore, pending more thorough inquiry into the larger issues presented
in the action, the court should not direct the respondent
public officials to violate their agreements of confidence where
the result may be so far-reaching and harmful and thus disrupt the functions of government both local and national.
In answer to the contention that the charter provisions
should override the agreements of confidence and the policy
invoked by the petitioners, it may be said that we are not
here determining the effect of the recognition of the agreements of confidence. In this proceeding we are concerned
only with the question of the propriety of the respondent
court's exercise of its power in granting the motion for inspection of the data relating to the source of the information
agreed to be treated as confidential. There is no conflict in
the evidence as to the adverse effect of disclosure on the
public interest. On the evidence and the law it is concluded
that the petitioners are entitled to have the confidential
matter deemed privileged under section 1881 ( 5) of the Code
of Civil Procedure and that the respondent court misapplied
an{:! therefore exceeded its jurisdiction in granting the motion
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for inspection. What may be the relation of the agreements
of confidence to the alleged cause of action or defense is not
a matter for consideration at this time. Questions of compliance by the commission and the board of supervisors with
the charter requirements are deemed not to be involved in this
proceeding. 'l'hey are more properly to be treated with the
larger issues presented in the pending mandamus proceeding. It is therefore not appropriate now to declare what application City & County of San Francisco v. Boyd, 22 Cal.2d
685 [140 P.2d 666], may have in the solution of those issues.
The Boyd case involved a question of compliance with the
same charter provisions in relation to the controller's refusal to pay wages in accordance with the adopted scale on
the ground that it was higher than the prevailing rate. The
city prevailed. 'rhe question whether compliance is sufficient
for the purpose of establishing the validity of the wage scales
when questioned by the employees can be decided only on the
trial in the mandamus proceeding. Therefore consideration
and determination of questions relating to the powers of the
commission and the board, the effect of the agreements of confidence on the existence of bases or support for the adopted
wage scales, and the validity of the ordinances are not precluded by the language herein nor by the g-ranting of the
writ in recognition of the official agreements of confidence.
In view of the necessarily restricted issue here, other points
do not require notice.
The application for the peremptory \Yrit of prohibition is
granted as prayed.
Gibson, C. J., Traynor, .T., Schauer, ,T., and Sprnce, ,J.,
concurred.
Edmonds, J., concurred in the judgment.
CARTER, ,J.-I concur in the result but not the reasoning
in the majority opinion. As I understand the opinion, it
holds that the court cannot properly compel thr civil service
commission to include, as a part of its public records, the
names of the private employers and the information each gave
on his wage scale, in spite of the charter provision ( § 151)
requiring the commission to "set forth in (its) official records of its proceedings aU of the data thus obtained," that
is, by its investigation. That result is reached by reasoning
that inasmuch as the commission gave a pledge of secrecy, it
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would be ag;aim;t publie policy to compel it to divulge the information. I agrPe with that reRult. The opinion goes on
to state, however, that it does not deeide whether the eharter
requires the commission to inelude the information in its
official records. It reserves that question for determination
in the mandamus proceeding where it might be held that
the charter provision compels those matters to be a part of
the record, and inasmuch as the commission has not done
so, it has not complied with the law (charter) in fixing the
rates of pay. Thus on that ground alone the ordinance fixing
the wage scale could be set aside. In that manner the commission would be required to keep faith with its pledge of
secrecy by the court's refusal to compel it to break its pledge,
but still the commission or the city would suffer, for the reason that all its procedure and ordinance fixing wages are a
nullity. In other words, the city bears the brunt of the
failure of its commission to follow the charter.
This is an indirect approach for which I see no reason.
'l'he charter is clear and specifies that all the data obtained
by the commission shall be set forth in its official records, and
it should be so held at this time. If it is believed that data
obtained by a promise of secrecy should not be used in this
case even though the commission had no authority to give
sueh a pledge, the more pertinent basis for such holding is
er:;toppel. That is to say, the one giving the information,
having done so on the assuranee that it was confidential, may
now claim that the city cannot reverse its position and betray that confidence. If it thus will not be permitted to
comply with the law, it follows that the wage scale cannot
stand, for it is not based upon the public 1·ecord of the data
obtained. 'l'he result is that the scale fixed is invalid on that
ground alone and the trial court should be so advised to guide
its decision in the mandamus action.
It may be said that C-ity & County of San Francisco v.
Boyd, 22 Ca1.2d 685 [140 P.2d 666], holds that the commission
need not set forth the name of each private employer and his
wage scale, but if it does it is incorrect, for it fails to consider
the effect of such a ruling. It would mean that there could
be no effective review of the commission's action. It is not
elear from the face of the opinion, however, that that precise
data was omitted from the public records of the commission
in the Boyd case.
My view is that the city is estopped from disclosing the
data obtained in confidence, but the ordinance fixing the

166

PEOPLE

v.

CnESSMAN

[38 C.2d

wage scale, which is based upon said data, is invalid, and
we should so hold. However, because of the pledge of secrecy
the commission should not be required to divulge the information and therefore its order to the contrary should be made
ineffective by prohibition, as is done by the majority opinion.
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied January
15, 1952. Edmonds, J., and Carter, J., were of the opinion
that the petition should be granted.

[ Crim. No. 5006.

In Bank.
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THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. CARYL CHESSMAN,
Appellant.
[1] Criminal Law-Rights of Accused-Aid of Counsel-Waiver.
-An accused who of his own volition and with full knowledge
of what he was doing waived assistance of counsel may not
properly assert that denial of a continuance deprived him of
a right to select counsel of his choice and deprived such counsel of an opportunity to prepare, especially where the accused
had the advisory services of a public defender throughout the
trial.
[2] !d.-Rights of Accused-Aid of Counsel-Waiver.-A defendant who intelligently refuses counsel and insists upon personally conducting and controlling his defense does not lose the
status of prisoner and become entitled to extraordinary privileges not accorded defendants who are represented by counsel, nor does he become entitled to proceed in a manner different from that permitted attorneys.
[1] See 7 Cal.Jur. 939; 14 Am.Jur. 882.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Crimimil Law,§ 110; [3] Criminal
Law, § 1067; [4] Criminal Law, § 96; [5] Criminal Law, § 264;
[6] Criminal Law, §1353; [7] Criminal Law, §1092; [8] Criminal Law, § 464; [9, 10] Criminal Law, § 816; [11, 12] Criminal
Law, § 1434; [13] Criminal Law, § 1418; [14] Criminal Law, § 752;
[15] Sodomy, § 11; [16] Sodomy, § 12; [17] Criminal Law, § 809;
[18] Criminal Law, § 1426; [19, 31] Kidnaping, § 2; [20] Kidnaping, § 9; [21] Robbery, § 4; [22] Robbery, § 38; [23] Criminal
Law,§ 358; [24] Robbery,§ 27; [25] Robbery,§ 33(1); [26] Robbery,§ 48; [27] Criminal Law,§ 912(2); [28] Criminal Law,§ 614;
[29] Criminal Law,§ 624; [30] Criminal Law,§ 348; [32] Kidnaping,§ 1; [33] Criminal Law,§ 119; [34] Criminal Law,§ 144; [35]
Criminal Law, § 1447.

